Daily returns for large and mid-cap stocks listed on the New York Exchange are not serially dependent. In contrast, order imbalances on the same stocks are highly persistent from day to day. These two empirical facts can be reconciled if sophisticated investors react to order imbalances within the trading day by engaging in countervailing trades sufficient to remove serial dependence over the daily horizon. How long does this actually take? The pattern of intra-day serial dependence, over intervals ranging from five minutes to one hour, reveals traces of efficiency-creating actions. For the stocks in our sample, it takes longer than five minutes for astute investors to begin such activities.
Evidence on the Speed of Convergence to Market Efficiency

I.
The Issue.
For most of its scientific life, the field of finance has debated the question of market efficiency. Despite a long list of empirical anomalies and extensive indications of psychological quirks among investors, most financial economists and professionals still profess that asset prices are difficult to predict. Schwert (2001) reviews a number of well-documented anomalies and finds that some of them have disappeared, perhaps revealing ephemeral market inefficiencies. But he argues also that other anomalies appear to have been "discovered" even though they did not exist.
There is a growing literature about the irrationalities of individual investors. Odean (1999) , for instance, finds that small investors have a perverse ability to forecast future returns; their stock purchases perform worse than their sales. Barber and Odean (2000) find that the more individuals trade, the worse their returns. Benartzi and Thaler (2001) document bizarre portfolio choices among individuals allocating pension assets to various classes.
Despite their reluctance to forecast prices, most scholars admit also that some individuals behave foolishly all the time and all individuals behave foolishly some of the time. When reconciling these conflicting views, we usually resort to flurry of hand waving and invoke the mantra of aggregation. Somehow, from within the blizzard of behavioral proclivities, the "market" becomes efficient, or, at least efficient enough that professors and money managers have a very difficult time beating passive investment strategies. But exactly how does this happen and how long does it take?
The concepts of market efficiency as defined by Fama (1970) in his seminal review, weak, semi-strong, or strong form efficiency, represent a road map for statistical tests.
They offer little insight about market processes that might deliver the hypothesized phenomena. Clearly, efficiency does not just congeal from spontaneous combustion. It depends, somehow, on individual actions.
This idea was formalized by Grossman (1976) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) who proved that the market price cannot fully incorporate all knowable information. Someone must be able to make (infra-marginal) returns from exploiting deviation of prices from fundamental values. But whom, and how? Cornell and Roll (1981) borrowed a model from evolutionary biology to show that efficient markets must be inhabited by both passive investors, who take prices as correct forecasts of future value, and by active investors who expend resources in an effort to detect errors in prices. Market efficiency is the state in which neither the marginal active nor the marginal passive investor has an incentive to alter his or her respective approach. Infra-marginal active investors pay to become better informed and somehow move prices enough that passive investors can enjoy a free ride without sacrificing much return (indeed, any return at the margin.)
Many investors still follow technical trading strategies that appear to generate little revenue and much cost; these strategies have long been the subject of much critique by finance professors. Recently, we uncovered a seemingly related and surprising phenomenon during a study of market-wide order imbalances on the New York Stock
Exchange. 1 Market order imbalance, defined as the aggregated daily market purchase orders less sell orders for stocks in the S&P500 index, is highly predictable from day to day. A day with a high imbalance on the buy side will likely be followed by several additional days of aggregate buy side imbalance; and similarly for an imbalance on the sell side. This implies that investors continue buying or selling for quite a long time, either because they are herding or because they are splitting large orders across days, or both. More than fifty percent of tomorrow's imbalance among S&P500 stocks can be forecast by past returns and past imbalances.
Yet the S&P500 index is virtually a random walk over a horizon of one day. During the 1988-98 sample period, it had a first order autocorrelation coefficient of 0.005 (p-value=0.78) and insignificant autocorrelations at all longer daily lags. This suggests, of course, that some astute investors must be correctly forecasting continuing price pressure from order imbalances and conducting countervailing trades within the very first day, trades sufficient to remove all serial dependence in returns which would otherwise be induced by the continuing procession of order imbalances.
There are at least two puzzles here: First, why do some naïve investors persist in their orders for days on end when it does them no good (because there is no inter-day return dependence)? Second, how long within the day does pressure from order imbalances continue to move prices? When thinking about this second and more imporatant question, it seems rather obvious that some finite time period, albeit perhaps quite a short period, is required for sophisticated investors to counteract a sudden and unexpected preponderance of orders on the same side of the market.
It simply cannot be true that returns are independent from trade to trade or even from minute to minute. It must take at least some time for astute investors to figure out what is happening to orders, to ascertain whether there is new pertinent information about values, and to expunge any serial dependence remaining after prices adjust to their new equilibrium levels. The horizon over which this activity takes place is the object of our study. We propose to investigate how long it takes the market to achieve weak-form efficiency; i.e., how long it takes to remove return dependence.
Other researchers have investigated questions similar to the one we address, but in very specific contexts. In early work, Patell and Wolfson (1984) show that dividend and earnings announcements "interrupt" the usual pattern of return serial dependence for at least fifteen minutes and that prices do not revert completely to their normal serial correlation pattern for up to ninety minutes. Although they make no explicit statement about how this happens, they clearly have in mind the activities of arbitrageurs who offset the impulsive reactions to company announcements of naïve investors. Garbade and Lieber (1977) formulate a model of independent changes in equilibrium price coupled with random orders to buy or to sell at quoted ask and bid prices. They use data on two stocks for a single month and find that this model does not describe price moves for short time intervals (a few minutes) while it is consistent with price moves over longer horizons. 2 In concluding, they recognize that "…investors who monitor the market continually during the day…" might be instrumental in bringing about the observed pattern.
Epps (1979) studies price adjustments for a group of firms in the same industry (automobiles). He finds rapid but not instantaneous adjustments across firms to common news relevant for all industry firms. Correlations among the returns increase with the time interval, which suggests cross-firm variation in the speed of adjustment to new information. Epps' overall conclusion is that "…the predictive value of a price change in one stock endures not much more than one hour…" but "…the average lag in the response of prices [to new information] is more then 10 minutes" (p. 298).
Related theoretical models were developed by Copeland (1976) and Hillmer and Yu (1979) . Copeland's model predicts a positive correlation between trading volume and absolute price change and positive skewness in volume. However, it does not include a provision for the activities of arbitrageurs. Hillmer and Yu note that the incorporation of information into prices "cannot be completed instantaneously" because "…in practice an investor will not react…unless he is convinced that it is economically advantageous." (p.
321.) They develop various alternative statistical models involving price, volume, and volatility, all inspired by the idea that investor/arbitrageurs would be watching the market closely and reacting occasionally. Their tests, however, involve only a handful of anecdotal events.
Much later, Chakrabarti and Roll (1999) formulate a model populated by Bayesian traders/arbitrageurs who attempt, through observing the trading of others, to deduce the quality of their information. Simulations of the model show that the market usually converges more rapidly to an equilibrium price and that it is a better predictor of true value when arbitrageurs react to one another as opposed to trading solely on their own information.
Section II below describes the data. Section III presents our analysis of how quickly prices of highly liquid stocks become efficient. Section IV concludes and suggests further investigations.
II. The Data.
Since we already know that serial dependence in returns is close to zero for active stocks over a daily horizon, our investigation of the efficiency-creating process must focus on intra-day trading. We would like to measure the timing of efficiency creation as precisely as possible, so it seems sensible to examine frequently-traded stocks for which very short term serial dependence can actually be observed. This suggests that small stocks should be excluded until further statistical developments make it possible to measure serial dependence even when trading is infrequent.
Because transactions data are so voluminous, this initial study uses only a limited sample of stocks and time. Our calculations here cover twenty large and twenty mid-cap stocks listed on the New York Exchange for two recent years, 1996 and 1998. These years were chosen because (a) transactions data are available from the TAQ (Trade and Automated Quotations) database recorded by the Exchange, and (b) they bracket a significant change in the minimum tick size, which was reduced from $1/8 to $1/16 during 1997. We hoped to discern the impact, if any, of that event. Future investigations should extend the investigation to smaller firms, and other years, exchanges, and countries.
The forty sample firms are listed in The first of these order imbalance measures disregards the size of the trade, counting small orders equally with large orders. The second and third measures weight large orders more heavily. The distinction is important here because we hope to shed light on how arbitrageurs make the market more efficient over very short horizons and presume that arbitrageurs tend to undertake larger trades as compared to naïve investors in order to quickly exploit deviations of prices from fundamentals.
III. The Evidence.
III.A. Evidence of efficiency at a daily horizon.
Using CRSP returns data, 4 we first set out to ascertain whether our sample of stocks conformed to semistrong-form efficiency over a daily horizon; i.e., whether future returns could be predicted by either past returns or past order imbalances. This positive (though insignificant) coefficient is somewhat surprising because negative first-order autocorrelation in trade-to-trade returns is known to be induced by the bid-ask bounce. During 1998, the large stocks did exhibit such negative autocorrelation as did the mid-cap stocks for 1996 (though the coefficient is insignificant.) There are two possibilities to explain the evident weakness of the bid-ask bounce; first, for these relatively liquid stocks, spreads might be too narrow to induce a pronounced bounce and second, there is actually positive dependence in bid-ask bounce-free returns that is more or less offset by the bounce, depending on the sample period.
To avoid contamination of return serial correlations by bid-ask bounce, we compute returns from quote mid-points as well as from transaction prices. So, for each transaction during every day, the quotes existing at least five seconds before the trade were used to compute a bid-ask midpoint. Returns were then computed from these midpoints. For example, the daily midpoint returns in Table 2 are computed from the bid and ask quotes just prior to the last transaction of the day. The daily autocorrelations in these midpoint returns are small and insignificant for both the large and the mid-cap stocks in both years.
Thus, it appears that the first explanation above about the weakness of the bid-ask bounce is probably the correct one; bid-ask spreads are small, and there is no evidence of positive serial dependence in true returns over a horizon of one day. Table 2 also reports simple correlations between returns and the three measures of order imbalance, both contemporaneous correlations and correlations with OIB lagged by one day. As could be expected, there is a very strong positive contemporaneous correlation between either measure of return (trade or midpoint) and any of the OIB measures. Not surprising also, the share and dollar measures, OIBSh and OIB$, are considerably more highly correlated with contemporaneous returns for the large firms.
The correlations between daily returns and lagged (by one day) order imbalances are completely insignificant in all cases for the share and dollar imbalances. However, lagged OIB# is significantly correlated with returns during 1996 though not during 1998.
The magnitude of the correlation is 0.06 or less, so the economic value of the implied prediction would be relatively small. We are not sure whether this represents a statistical aberration or something truly material such as a small improvement in market efficiency perhaps brought about by the minimum tick size reduction.
Notice that the order imbalance measures themselves are strongly and positively autocorrelated from day to day, a feature particularly striking for OIB# (which weights all trades equally regardless of size). For the large stock group, its autocorrelation coefficient exceeds 0.5 in both 1996 and 1998. In an earlier paper, Chordia, Roll, and
Subrahmanyam (2001) show that even aggregate market order imbalances persist for several days.
III.B. Evidence about efficiency over short horizons with the trading day.
We computed short-horizon returns from prices closest to the end of various time intervals within the trading day. For example, ten-minute returns are computed for each stock by finding the transaction closest to 9:40 a.m., 9:50 a.m., etc. 6 . Since some calculations involve lagged values, the first interval of each trading day is discarded because it would have been correlated with a lagged interval from the previous trading day. 7 Throughout this sub-section, all the reported correlations were first computed within the trading day for each stock, then averaged across all trading days and stocks.
correlated. This implies that the estimated standard error of the sample mean is too small since it omits the mostly positive covariance terms that would be in the true standard error. 6 During 1996 and 1998, New York Stock Exchange trading hours were 9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. 7 Intervals of sixty minutes were set backward from the end of the trading day. For example, each day has five one-hour intervals (11-12, 12-1,…,3-4) included in the calculations; the interval from 10 to 11 a.m. provides lagged observations only and data from 9:30 to 10 a.m. are not used at all.
There is admittedly some sloppiness involved in computing very short-term returns because trades do not necessarily occur at the exact ending time of each interval. If the closest price to the end of an interval was more than 150 seconds away, either before or after, the return for that interval was not used in our calculations. Within the large stock sample, the average difference between the transaction time and the end of a five-minute interval was 25 seconds. Over intervals longer than five minutes, this problem obviously becomes progressively less material.
Order imbalances were computed over all trades within each time interval. For example, contemporaneous OIB# during the ten-minutes ending at 9:50 a.m. consists of the number of buyer-initiated trades less the number of seller-initiated trades between 9:40:01 a.m. and 9:50:00 a.m. The lagged ten-minute OIB# is the corresponding accumulation between 9:30:01 a.m. and 9:40:00 a.m.
The contemporaneous correlation between trade-based returns and midpoint-based returns is, as one would expect, quite large, positive, and significant. However, it is not perfect, particularly for the very short time intervals. The correlation is only 0.622 over five-minute intervals on average for large stocks during 1996. 8 For the same group/year, the correlation grows steadily as the interval lengthens; it is 0.749 at 10 minutes, 0.802 at 15 minutes, 0.868 at 30 minutes, and 0.882 at 60 minutes. During 1998, all these correlations were considerably higher regardless of interval 9 but the same pattern prevailed; they increased with interval length. The mid-cap stocks displayed somewhat lower correlations than the large stocks, undoubtedly because they do not trade as frequently; again, however, the same pattern of increase with interval length is evident. Table 3 reports intra-day autocorrelations for returns and order imbalances over horizons ranging from five minutes to one hour. The microstructure issue of bid-ask bounce can be easily discerned by comparing the sizes of autocorrelation coefficients from trade returns as opposed to midpoint returns. In every case, they are larger (more negative) for trade returns. For instance, over five minutes intervals for large stocks in 1996 the autocorrelation using trade returns is -.203 while it is only -.043 with midpoint returns.
The relative difference declines steadily as the interval lengthens, but some difference remains even at 60 minutes. During 1998, the five-minute interval shows about the same relative difference, -.094 versus -.026 and the same change for longer horizons. The mid-cap sample conforms closely to the large stock sample in both years.
For both large and mid-cap stocks, autocorrelations fell in absolute magnitude from 1996 to 1998, the reduction being particularly prominent at the shorter intervals. Perhaps the June 24, 1997 reduction in the minimum tick size reduced the cost of arbitrage and increased its reaction speed. It seems likely that many highly liquid firms had quoted spreads equal to the minimum tick size; consequently, they experienced a fifty percent reduction in quoted spreads between 1996 and 1998. Ball and Chordia (2001) confirm that the average quoted spread declined from 21.3 cents to 11.9 cents between February and November 1997 in a sample of seven large firms.
As Table 3 shows, order imbalances are highly positively autocorrelated over a fiveminute interval. For example, OIB# has an autocorrelation coefficient of 0.126 (tstatistic 32.0) for the large stock group in 1996. Share and dollar order imbalance measures have autocorrelations only about half as large, but they remain highly significant and positive. There is a similar pattern in 1998 for the large stocks and for the mid-cap stocks in both years. We propose that the autocorrelation is higher for the OIB# because it is more likely to pick up the actions of naïve traders (e.g., retail investors), who might follow unsophisticated herding strategies.
By ten minutes, autocorrelation in order imbalances has been attenuated, but is still significantly positive. The autocorrelation is negative at 60 minutes; (for OIBSH and OIB$ this happens at 30 minutes.) For reasons to be discussed shortly, however, we do not assert that these negative autocorrelations are truly significant despite their large computed t-values.
III.C. Bias in estimating the autocorrelation coefficient.
It has been long known that the autocorrelation coefficient is downward biased, rather severely so in small samples (Cf. Kendall, 1954, and Marriott and Pope 1954) . 10 The number of observations per day decreases sharply with interval length. While there are 78 five-minute intervals each day, there are only six sixty-minute intervals.
Bias is undoubtedly responsible for some of the systematic decline in all autocorrelation coefficients in Table 3 as the interval grows. For example, the midpoint return autocorrelation for large stocks in 1996 falls from -.043 at five minutes to -.148 at sixty minutes. A similar pattern can be observed in autocorrelation coefficients for all the variables; even the OIB measures, which are strongly positively autocorrelated over fiveminute intervals, become negatively autocorrelated at sixty-minute intervals. Those negative long-interval autocorrelations are possibly spurious and the true autocorrelation could even be positive.
To investigate this phenomenon, we decided to engage the bootstrap using a subsample, the large stock group for 1996 and midpoint returns. mean is only about -.01 for five-minute intervals, it declines to around -.25 for sixtyminute intervals.
Comparing the bootstrapped fractiles to our original point estimates, it seems apparent that autocorrelations in midpoint returns really are significantly negative for five-, ten-, and fifteen-minute intervals. In these cases, most of our point estimates fall well below the bootstrap 5 th percentile. However, the point estimates for the thirty-minute interval are scattered within the extreme percentiles of the bootstrap distribution and more of them are actually near the 95 th percentile. At sixty minutes, virtually all are above the 95 th percentile. This implies, of course, that the true autocorrelation at sixty minutes is actually significantly positive even though the point estimate is negative; the same conclusion, albeit with lesser confidence appears possible at thirty minutes as well.
We did not bootstrap the OIB variables or the trade returns, but the similarity in patterns seems to indicate clearly that the same phenomenon is at work. In the case of the OIB measures, they are likely positively autocorrelated at all intervals.
III.D. Conclusions about autocorrelations.
Our sample autocorrelation coefficients confound three distinct effects. First, there is the true autocorrelation within a sample interval; second, there is the small sample negative bias; and third, there is a positive bias induced by a shifting mean over the time interval in which the autocorrelation is measured. Since we computed the autocorrelation coefficients in Table 3 within each trading day, and then averaged them across trading days, the sample mean return for each trading day served as the implicit conditional expected return for the autocorrelation computed on that day. This conditional (sample) mean is, of course, highly variable across time. Consequently, if time variation in the conditional mean is large enough, it could mask intra-day negative serial dependence.
The results for midpoint returns confirm that negative serial dependence is not just a spurious microstructure phenomenon, at least for very short intervals of five and ten minutes. By sixty minutes, however, after correcting for small sample bias, midpoint autocorrelation becomes positive. This seems likely to be caused by a weakening of the true negative autocorrelation as the interval lengthens; in addition, over longer intervals, the shifting mean effect becomes dominant.
The striking negative autocorrelation at very short intervals and its weakening over longer intervals is consistent with (1) specialists temporarily changing price quotes away from fundamentals in order to manage their inventory, and (2) arbitrageurs engaging in countervailing trades after they have witnessed short-term price moves. Both actions could, of course, be taking place. This seems all the more likely in that order imbalances are very strongly positively autocorrelated. If arbitrageurs were not taking offsetting actions, positive serial dependence in order imbalances would induce the same thing in returns.
III.E. Multiple regressions.
Our explanation of how the market converges to weak-form efficiency has been supported to this point by an examination of simple autocorrelation coefficients. The stylized facts are these: (1) very short term returns are negatively autocorrelated; 11 (2) As the return interval lengthens, from five minutes up to sixty minutes, the negative correlation disappears; 12 (3) order imbalances are strongly positively autocorrelated.
We have interpreted these results to reveal the actions of three distinct groups. Order imbalances in the first instance arise from traders who believe themselves to be in the possession of pertinent information. Order imbalances are positively autocorrelated, which suggests that naïve traders are jumping on the bandwagon or spreading their orders out over time (or both). Second, NYSE specialists react to initial order imbalances by altering quotes away from fundamental value in an effort to control inventory. Finally, astute traders intervene with countervailing trades in the direction opposite to the initial 11 This is not merely a bid/ask bounce effect because midpoint returns display the same phenomenon, though the magnitude is smaller than for trade returns. 12 The sample autocorrelation remains negative as the interval lengthens, but the bootstrap results reveal that the small sample bias is so severe that the correct inference (for sixty minutes) is that the true autocorrelation is significantly positive.
order imbalances. Arbitrage takes at least some time, which explains why the autocorrelation in returns changes sign as the time interval grows.
To help elucidate this interpretation, Table 4 presents a series of multiple regressions with the same variables. 13 In all regressions, the dependent variable is the midpoint return 14 for an individual stock while explanatory variables include the lagged midpoint return and contemporaneous and lagged measures of order imbalance for that stock. 15 Since all intra-day observations for an entire year are used in the same regression, there is no small sample bias of the sort that affected the autocorrelations in the previous subsection. Focusing first on large stocks in 1996, the lagged returns have significant negative coefficients in all regressions for five-minute intervals and, confirming our earlier findings, they become mostly positive or insignificant at the longer intervals. 13 To conserve space, we consider only the OIB# and OIB$ measures of order imbalance. The OIBSh measure yields results similar to those for OIB$. 14 Similar regressions were also estimated for trade returns but are not reported in the interest of brevity. The main difference involves the bid-ask bounce, which impacts the trade returns and is absent from the midpoint returns. This results in the coefficients for lagged trade returns being algebraically smaller and, for the shorter intervals, more significantly negative, than the corresponding coefficients for lagged midpoint returns. 15 While there is clear multicollinearity induced by the inclusion of both contemporaneous and lagged imbalance, this should attenuate standard errors and reduce significance. Thus, multicollinearity does not detract from the significant coefficients on which we focus.
Contemporaneous order imbalances, whatever the measure or interval, are positive and highly significant.
In all of the regressions, the coefficient for OIB$ t-1 is larger and more significant than the coefficient for OIB# t-1 in explaining the return at time t. OIB# t-1 has a positive, though insignificant coefficient at five minutes. By ten minutes, it becomes negative and significant while OIB$ t-1 remains positive. This pattern persists out to sixty minutes but OIB$ t-1 is insignificant beyond fifteen minutes. Both coefficients decline monotonically as the trading interval lengthens from five to sixty minutes. Notice that the contemporaneous OIB coefficients do not decline very much with interval length; indeed, in the case of OIB$, they do not decline at all.
This pattern is consistent with the traces of two types of investors. Smaller traders, whose actions are weighted equally in the OIB# measure, are presumably more likely to be "naïve." Their order imbalances tend to be offset by arbitrageurs and/or specialists.
This takes at least ten minutes. The relative sizes of coefficients for OIB# t and OIB# t-1
give a proximate indication of the naïve trades that are offset. At ten minutes, the initial price impact is offset by about eleven percent (-0.943/8.94) while at 15, 30, and 60 minutes it is offset by roughly 16%, 24%, and 33%, respectively.
Turning to OIB$, which presumably weights more astute traders more heavily, we find that its lagged coefficients are significantly positive for five, ten, and fifteen minutes (for large stocks in 1996). They fall to insignificance at thirty minutes but remain positive.
This pattern in 1996 indicates that traders were responding on average to larger orders by jumping on the bandwagon, placing additional orders in the same direction, rather than conducting countervailing trades as they appeared to be doing after smaller orders. This happened rapidly; notice the relative sizes of the contemporaneous and lagged coefficients for OIB$. At five minutes, the lagged coefficient is about 18 percent as large as the contemporaneous coefficient. The percentage drops to 10%, 7%, 2%, and 0.1% as the interval lengthens from 10 to 60 minutes.
In 1998 for large stocks, there is a similar algebraic decline for OIB# t-1 as the return interval lengthens. In contrast to 1996, however, it is negative even at five minutes. This seems to suggest that arbitrageurs were intervening more quickly with countervailing trades in 1998. Moreover, the coefficients for OIB$ t-1 show no bandwagon effect in 1998. They too are negative after five minutes. However, the coefficients for OIB$ t-1 are much smaller (in absolute value) than the coefficients for OIB# t-1 , and they also represent smaller percentages of their corresponding contemporaneous coefficient. For instance, at sixty minutes, about 36% of OIB# is reversed (-2.87/7.89) while only about 10% of OIB$ is reversed (-.455/4.43). Evidently, larger orders contain more accurate information and thus offer no genuine arbitrage opportunities.
The pattern of coefficients for mid-cap stocks is similar in many respects. For example, the coefficient of the contemporaneous order imbalance is always positive and highly significant, regardless of the return interval or the OIB measure employed. The magnitudes of these contemporaneous coefficients are considerably larger than for large cap stocks, perhaps revealing that order imbalances of a given size have a greater impact on mid-cap stocks, presumably because inventory and asymmetric information concerns are more important in stocks that trade relatively less frequently.
There are some differences between the mid-cap and large patterns in the other coefficients. Notice, for example, that the coefficient of the lagged return remains significantly negative in some cases out to thirty minutes; this is a longer delay than for large stocks. The coefficient for lagged OIB# t-1 does not become negative until thirty (fifteen) minutes in 1996 (1998). This also is a delay relative to large cap stocks, where the corresponding coefficient was negative at ten minutes in 1996 and five minutes in 1998. Evidently, countervailing arbitrage trading takes a bit longer for mid-cap than for the largest stocks.
There is also a small contrast between mid-cap and large stocks in the pattern of coefficients for OIB$ t-1 . The coefficient declines as the return interval lengthens but is larger at all intervals for mid-cap stocks and is negative only after thirty minutes in 1998.
This too is consistent with a slower pace of arbitrage activity.
IV. Conclusions
The long and continuing debate about financial market efficiency has been relatively silent about the behavior of actual traders. Somehow, perhaps unwittingly, they act collectively to push markets toward efficiency. Except in an idealized theoretical world, this cannot happen instantaneously. There must be some time interval, albeit very short, over which the actions of efficiency-creating traders remain incomplete. A central goal of this paper is to present evidence about this important issue, the speed of convergence to market efficiency.
For convenience, we study weak-form efficiency (Fama, 1970) , which is concerned only with serial dependence in returns. Of course, even weak-form efficiency cannot be attained immediately. Using a sample of intra-day returns for large and mid-cap stocks during calendar years 1996 and 1998, we find that weak-form efficiency does appear to prevail over intervals of a day or longer. There is evidence, however, that some traders cause serial dependence in prices over short intervals of a few minutes. But there is also strong evidence that other traders become aware of price-moving order imbalances and undertake countervailing trades.
To obtain these results, we circumvent the bid-ask bounce by using returns computed from bid-ask quote midpoints. Yet like trade returns, midpoint returns also are negatively serially correlated over intervals up to ten minutes for large stocks and over somewhat longer intervals for mid-cap stocks. 16 (Order imbalances themselves are highly positively dependent over short intervals.) We argue that this is consistent with NYSE specialists altering quotes away from fundamentals for the purpose of inventory control, while 16 Because of the bid-ask bounce, the negative dependence in trade returns is larger in absolute magnitude.
awaiting countervailing trades. By thirty to sixty minutes, depending on firm size, there is no remaining serial dependence in returns.
Multiple regressions of midpoint returns on lagged midpoint returns plus contemporaneous and lagged order imbalances are consistent with the gist of this story.
Order imbalances measured in number of trades are reversed as the return interval lengthens, evidently because sophisticated investors undertake countervailing actions.
Order imbalances measured in dollars, which reflect larger orders, are not reversed as soon, though they are attenuated to some extent with time.
There is suggestive evidence that that arbitrage activity became more effective between 1996 and 1998, perhaps as a result of the reduction in the minimum tick size from $1/8 to $1/16 during 1997.
These results make one wonder about the existence of market anomalies and inefficiencies in general. If there is no significant evidence of weak-form inefficiency at intervals of thirty minutes, it is hard to understand how the market could be inefficient at horizons of six to twelve months as in the extensive literature on much longer-term anomalies. 17 Investigation of this apparent conundrum could be a worthwhile area for future research.
17 E.g., the momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) effect. Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998, 2001) , and Hong and Stein (1999) attempt to explain momentum and other inefficiencies using models with irrational investors. For stocks listed in Table 1 , trade returns are computed from the last transaction price of each day and midpoint returns are computed from the average of the bid-ask quotes associated with the last transaction of each day. Trade returns are from CRSP. Bid-Ask quotes and order imbalances (OIB) are from the NYSE TAQ data base. OIB# is the number of buyer-initiated less the number of seller-initiated trades during the same day as the return; OIBSh is the number of buyer-initiated shares purchased less the number of seller-initiated shares sold that day; OIB$ is the total dollars paid by buyer-initiators less the total dollars received by seller-initiators that day. The product-moment correlation coefficient is reported along with a t-statistic computed from the cross-sectional distribution of correlation coefficients. Daily returns and order imbalances are obtained from the NYSE TAQ data base for stocks listed in Table 1 . The return is computed from the actual trade price (Trade Return) or from the midpoint of the bid-ask spread (Midpoint Return) associated with the transaction nearest the end of an intra-day time interval of fixed length. The first interval of each day is excluded. OIB# is the number of buyer-initiated less the number of sellerinitiated trades during the same time interval as the return; OIBSh is the number of buyer-initiated shares purchased less the number of seller-initiated shares sold during that interval; OIB$ is the total dollar amount expended by buyer-initiators less the total dollar amount received by seller-initiators during that interval. The product-moment autocorrelation coefficient is reported along with a t-statistic computed from the crosssectional distribution of correlation coefficients. Daily returns and order imbalances are obtained from the NYSE TAQ data base for the twenty large and twenty mid-cap stocks listed in Table 1 . The return is computed from the midpoint of the bid-ask spread associated with the transaction nearest the end of an intra-day time interval of fixed length. OIB# is the number of buyer-initiated less the number of seller-initiated trades during the same time interval as the return. OIB$ is the total dollar amount expended by buyerinitiators less the total dollar amount received by seller-initiators during that interval. The first interval of each day is excluded and all other interval observations during each calendar year, (either 1996 or 1998) , are included in the same regression. A separate regression is estimated for each individual stock. The first number in each cell is the cross-sectional mean of the estimated regression coefficient. The second number (the first number in parentheses) is a t-statistic computed from the cross-sectional distribution of the estimated coefficients assuming independence. The third number (also in parentheses) is the average t-statistic from the individual regressions. The R 2 is the cross-sectional average adjusted R-square in percent. To adjust the units for presentation, the coefficients for OIB# have been multiplied by 10 5 and the coefficients for OIB$ have been multiplied by 10 10 . 
